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Abstract 
The perception-action model with its assumptions of distinct visual pathways for perception and 
visuomotor control has been highly influential but also contentious. The controversy largely focused 
on the evidence from studies on perceptual illusions and this scientific field has been reviewed quite 
a few times in recent years. In contrast another aspect of the model, namely the role of visual 
memory in action control, received comparatively little attention. With respect to visual memory the 
perception-action model proposes that only the perceptual or ventral stream can maintain a 
sustained representation of the visual world while the visuomotor system or dorsal stream has to 
rely on currently available visual information. Consequently, visual information from the dorsal 
system cannot guide actions that are based on memorized visual information. We call this feature of 
the perception-action model:  the dorsal amnesia hypothesis. There are at least two reasons for why 
this hypothesis is of special relevance. Firstly, it provides a particularly clear criterion to distinguish 
between functions of the ventral and dorsal stream. Secondly, this hypothesis led to some 
unexpected discoveries which provided particularly compelling evidence in favour of the model. In 
this review, we will revisit all relevant empirical areas, ranging from physiological examinations and 
neuropsychological studies to behavioural experiments in neurologically intact participants. Based 
on this review, we conclude that the dorsal amnesia hypothesis is in our view no longer tenable.  
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In 1992, Goodale and Milner suggested that the primate visual system consists of two distinct visual 
systems (Goodale & Milner, 1992). According to this view, the cortical visual system originates in the 
primary visual cortex, V1, and then splits into a dorsal stream which projects into the posterior 
parietal cortex and a ventral stream projecting into the regions of the temporal cortex. Onto this 
anatomical division they mapped a functional division: the ventral stream is assumed to support 
visual perception and the dorsal stream is associated with functions relating to the visual guidance of 
actions. This model, here called the ‘the perception-action model’, provided a good account for a 
surprising set of neuropsychological observations in patient DF. Following carbon-monoxid 
poisoning, DF was unable to reliably discriminate objects on the basis of their form, size or 
orientation. Despite these profound perceptual deficits, she reliable adjusted her hand during 
reaching and grasping movements to the form, size and orientation of target objects (Goodale, 
Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner et al., 1991). Within the framework of the perception-action 
model this counterintuitive dissociation between preserved visuomotor control and impaired 
perception could be explained. It seemed that in DF’s case the ventral or perceptual system had 
been profoundly impaired while the dorsal or visuomotor system had been left largely intact. This 
neuroanatomical interpretation received support from early structural scans of DF’s brain (Milner et 
al., 1991) and with some reservations also from a later structural and functional MRI study (Bridge et 
al., 2013; James, Culham, Humphrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2003)1. The behavioural dissociation 
between perception and action not only suggested the existence of two anatomically distinct and 
functionally specialized visual systems but also pointed to the surprising independence with which 
these two systems could operate (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 2006).  
Prior to the formulation of the perception-action model, other researchers had already suggested 
that the visual system might consist of two distinct subsystems (Schneider, 1969; Trevarthen, 1968; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). In fact, it was Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) who introduced the 
distinction between ventral and dorsal visual streams and thereby provided a first anatomical 
characterization of the two systems to which Milner and Goodale referred to in their model. 
However, while the functional characterization of the two-visual pathways suggested by Ungerleider 
                                                          
1 In the case of DF, brain damage resulted from carbon monoxide poisoning leading to diffuse and widespread 
lesions. A recent MRI study provided a detailed characterisation of the pathological changes in DF’s brain 
(Bridge et al. 2013). Bridge et al. (2013) compared the thickness of DF’s cortex with that of healthy, age-
matched controls. As expected, thickness of LOC differed substantially between patient DF and the control 
participants, but the same was also true for the posterior portion of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). In fact all 
examined visual cortical areas with the exception of area V1 and MT were significantly thinner in DF than in 
healthy controls.  This finding prompts the question of how appropriate it is to describe DF as a patient with 
selective damage to the ventral streams.  
 
. 
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and Mishkin appeared to be somewhat arbitrary, the functional division suggested by Milner and 
Goodale seemed highly plausible in the context of an evolutionary approach to the understanding of 
the primate visual system. More importantly, the distinction between visual systems for perception 
and action proved to be conceptually fertile because it seems obvious that those two functions 
require very different forms of visual processing. A perceptual system whose main purpose is to 
recognize objects and scenes and to understand the relation of objects within a scene obviously 
needs to have the capability to identify those aspects of the visual world irrespective of the 
conditions under which these objects and scenes are seen. Thus, it is important that the perceptual 
system extracts invariances that are not affected by the position of the observer, the illumination of 
the scene, or any other conditions that are incidental to the current observational situation and 
irrelevant for object identification. This seems in contrast to the requirements of the action-system. 
In order to plan and execute an action, the position of the observer (and now actor) to the object is a 
critical parameter that needs to be taken into account for a successful interaction with the object. 
This distinction between a perceptual system concentrating on invariant features of objects and 
scenes and an action system taking account of observer-relative features allowed Goodale and his 
colleagues to derive predictions that could also be tested in healthy observers.  
This meant that the explanatory power of the model is not restricted to one domain of psychology 
(e.g. neuropsychology) but touches upon other domains as well (e.g. anatomy and physiology of the 
visual system and psychophysics). This explains why the model proved to be very influential. 
Accordingly, the model and its implications have been reviewed many times in the past. For 
example, numerous reviews examined the claim that visual illusions affect perceptual performance 
more than visuomotor performance (Bruno, 2001; Carey, 2001; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; 
Kopiske, Bruno, Hesse, Schenk, & Franz, 2016) and several recent reviews also examined the 
neuropsychological evidence for the model (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 2008; Schenk, 2010; Schenk & 
McIntosh, 2010; Westwood & Goodale, 2011). But one aspect of the model, namely its claim that 
the dorsal stream has only a very short visual memory, received comparatively little attention and is 
still seen as largely uncontroversial (see Heath, Neely, Krigolson, & Binsted, 2010). Hence, this topic 
will be the focus of this review paper.  
Milner and Goodale (1995, 2006) argued that the dorsal visuomotor system cannot store relevant 
visual information for more than one or at most two seconds2. As we move around, we change our 
                                                          
2 In fact, Westwood and Goodale (2003) argued that this period is even shorter. According to their real-time 
view of action, the dorsal system relies on ‘just-in-time’ computations. The necessary retinal information will 
have to be present at the time the movement is programmed. This does not happen until the decision to act 
has been reached (see Milner & Goodale, 2006; p. 247). Consequently, whenever the relevant visual 
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position and thus perspective on objects all the time. However, for successful interactions with the 
world, only the current perspective and the current spatial relationship between observer and goal 
object are relevant. Hence, it is expected that the dorsal system will only act on current information 
and has neither the need nor the capability for storing visual information over longer periods of time 
(see Milner & Goodale, 2006; pp. 41, 174, 246ff). Consequently, whenever an action has to be based 
on previous (remembered) information that is stored in visual memory, the visual input for this 
action has to come from the ventral perceptual stream (Milner & Goodale, 2006, pp. 137, 172, 246, 
248). This assumption leads to a number of interesting predictions. For example, it is expected that 
perceptual illusions which presumably originate in the ventral stream will affect visual actions 
performed after a delay (and thus relying on visual memory) even though the very same illusions will 
have little impact on actions performed without delay (and thus relying on real-time visual 
information). It can also be expected that a patient with selective lesions in the ventral stream, like 
patient DF, will fail in visuomotor tasks that introduce a delay between the presentation of the visual 
target information and the initiation of the visuomotor response even if she demonstrated normal 
performance in the real-time versions of those tasks. Both predictions seemed to be confirmed in 
previous studies (Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor, 1994; Westwood & Goodale, 2003). However, the 
most impressive confirmation for this prediction of the perception-action model came, without 
doubt, from patients suffering from optic ataxia. These patients have lesions in cortical areas that 
are associated with the dorsal stream. They misreach when performing reaching movements to 
visual targets, and their issues are particularly pronounced when they are prevented from directly 
looking at the target while performing their actions (Borchers, Muller, Synofzik, & Himmelbach, 
2013; Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). According to the perception-action model, these patients 
exemplify the behaviour that can be expected when the dorsal stream is damaged; namely they 
have problems processing visual information for the guidance of actions (Goodale, Meenan, et al., 
1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 2006). It is interesting to consider what happens if 
such patients are asked to perform their movements on the basis of visual information held in their 
memory. Given the dorsal stream’s inability to store visual information, neither healthy actors nor 
patients can base their actions on visual information mediated by the dorsal stream. Instead they 
have to rely on visual information from the only visual system capable of storing visual information - 
the ventral stream. In the case of healthy participants, it can be expected that visuomotor behaviour 
will become less accurate and more variable when a delay is introduced. The reason for this 
prediction is that visual information after a delay will have to come from the ventral stream and is 
therefore not optimized for visuomotor control. Again, this prediction was tested and confirmed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
information is withdrawn prior to the participants receiving their go-signal, the ventral stream needs to 
provide the relevant visual information to guide the forthcoming visuomotor act.  
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(Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2001). Yet, more interestingly, the exact opposite would be predicted for 
patients suffering from optic ataxia. Patients with optic ataxia will, after delay, also draw the sensory 
input for their visuomotor behaviour from the ventral stream and even though this ventral 
information is not optimal for visuomotor control, it is still much better than the lesion-
compromised visual information held in the dorsal stream of those patients. Consequently, optic 
ataxia patients are expected to show more accurate reaching performance when the visual target is 
held in memory as compared to situations in which the target remains visible. This is a truly 
surprising, some might even say paradoxical, prediction that could, however, be confirmed in 
subsequent experiments (e.g., Milner, Paulignan, Dijkerman, Michel, & Jeannerod, 1999).  
In this review article, we will re-examine the hypothesis that the dorsal stream does not possess a 
memory for visual information. For the sake of brevity, we will call this hypothesis “the dorsal 
amnesia hypothesis”. The claim of dorsal amnesia is important for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a 
very clear criterion to distinguish between tasks that involve the ventral stream and those that do 
not. Whenever, the relevant visual information for action has to be kept in memory for at least 2 
seconds (or according to the real-time view even for just a few milliseconds; see Westwood and 
Goodale (2003)), the ventral stream becomes critically involved in the visual guidance of the 
corresponding visuomotor act. This allows us to derive many precise predictions and thus allows 
good tests for the validity of the perception-action model. Moreover, the precision of this criterion 
sets it apart from other properties that have been used to describe the functional properties of the 
ventral and dorsal stream within the perception-action model. As has been noted elsewhere,  most 
of the other distinguishing properties suggested to indicate dorsal vs. ventral stream processing (e.g. 
explicit versus implicit processing; indirect versus direct visuo-motor relationships, planning versus 
programming) are more controversial and often poorly operationalised (Clark, 2009; Jeannerod & 
Jacob, 2005; Milner & Goodale, 2006; Schenk, 2006, 2010). The second reason why the dorsal 
amnesia claim is of special relevance for the status of the perception-action model relates to the 
novelty of one of the findings predicted by this hypothesis. As described above, this hypothesis 
correctly predicted that patients with optic ataxia are less impaired when forced to base their 
actions on memorized visual targets as compared to visible targets. For other findings put forward in 
support of the perception-action model, like the observations that both visual illusions as well as 
ventral-stream damage affect visual perception more strongly than action, alternative accounts 
without a dual-system assumption have been offered (Dassonville, Bridgeman, Bala, Thiem, & 
Sampanes, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Schenk, 2010, 2012a; 2012b on ventral stream 
damage). However, in the case of the memory-induced paradoxical improvement of optic ataxia 
patients, it seems hard to conceive of an account that does not assume two separate visual systems 
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with different properties and different functional roles. Clearly this finding gives special weight to 
the dorsal amnesia hypothesis. It is therefore of interest to closely scrutinise the empirical basis of 
this hypothesis.  
The most recent comprehensive review on this topic came to the conclusion that the dorsal amnesia 
hypothesis is overwhelmingly supported by empirical studies (Heath et al., 2010). However, the 
validity of a theory is not decided by the quantitative relationship between the studies in its favour 
and those in opposition. Instead its validity must be decided by its ability or inability to account for 
challenging evidence and its potential to predict novel and unexpected effects. Accordingly, we will 
focus in our review on findings that are either particularly difficult to explain without recourse to the 
dorsal amnesia hypothesis, or contradict key features of this hypothesis. By its very nature such a 
review will be selective.  
Our review paper is divided into seven sections. The first section will describe evidence from 
physiological, fMRI and TMS studies to examine the claim that ventral and dorsal regions differ in 
their ability to maintain visual representations and in their contribution to immediate versus 
memory-based visuomotor acts. The second section will review the claim that ventral-stream 
damage impairs memory-based visuomotor behaviour. The third section looks at the 
complementary prediction for patients with dorsal-stream damage who were found to produce 
better visuomotor behaviour when guided by information from visual memory. The next three 
sections will look at evidence for the dorsal amnesia hypothesis from healthy humans. The fourth 
section reviews studies examining the impact of memory intervals on motor performance. The fifth 
section assesses the prediction that visual illusions affect visuomotor behaviour more strongly when 
the motor response is based on memorized visual information. The assumption about illusions and 
their effect on different types of action is to some extent a special case of the more general 
assumption that allocentric or scene-based spatial information contributes more to memory-based 
as compared to immediate visuomotor behaviour. This assumption will be examined in our 
penultimate section. Finally, in our seventh and final section, the arguments will be summarized and 
the implications for the perception-action model discussed.  
1. A visual path with no memory? Evidence from neurophysiology, fMRI and TMS 
The dorsal amnesia hypothesis assumes that visual representations in the dorsal stream are too 
transient to support memory-based actions. Both electrophysiological recordings from dorsal-stream 
neurons in non-human primates and fMRI studies on cortical areas situated in the dorsal stream can 
be consulted to address this question. The few non-human primate studies that have looked directly 
at the time-course of spiking activity in parietal regions associated with visually guided hand 
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movements (e.g. AIP, area 7a) or visually guided saccades (LIP or area 7a) found evidence of 
sustained activity for several seconds that remained at a high level during the retention interval in 
visual short-term memory tasks (Gnadt & Andersen, 1988; Murata, Gallese, Kaseda, & Sakata, 1996; 
Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 1997). We are not aware of a study that compares the time course of 
single-unit activity directly between dorsal and ventral stream areas, and to our knowledge no 
statistical test comparing the prevalence of sustained versus non-sustained spiking visual neurons in 
dorsal versus ventral stream areas has been reported. Thus, we turn to fMRI studies where recently 
a number of studies examined the capacity for sustained activity in human dorsal stream areas. An 
early attempt to locate areas of the human visuomotor pathway using fMRI employed a behavioural 
task that required participants to memorize the visual target for their pointing responses for as long 
as nine seconds (Connolly, Andersen, & Goodale, 2003). Given that despite this delay robust dorsal-
stream activity could be found, the conclusion seems to be that the dorsal stream can retain the 
relevant information for several seconds. A few recent studies confirmed this conclusion more 
directly. In a series of experiments, Christophel and colleagues (Christophel, Cichy, Hebart, & 
Haynes, 2015; Christophel, Hebart, & Haynes, 2012) used the technique of multi-voxel pattern 
analysis to determine whether regions of the posterior parietal cortex can retain information about 
a visual stimulus after its removal. They found that the activity in these regions is sufficiently precise 
and sustained to allow the accurate classification of the presented stimulus even several seconds 
after its removal. Christophel et al. (2012) concluded that regions within the posterior parietal 
cortex, some of which have been associated with reaching and grasping behaviour, contribute to 
visual short-term memory. Himmelbach et al. (2009) and Fiehler, Bannert, et al. (2011) went one 
step further and examined whether there was any fMRI evidence to support the claim that when a 
delay is introduced control for the visual guidance of action shifts from dorsal to ventral stream 
regions. Fiehler, Bannert, et al. (2011) compared brain activity for delayed and non-delayed 
visuomotor tasks in a group of healthy participants and Himmelbach and colleagues (2009) 
examined the same contrast and also included a patient with optic ataxia. Both studies found robust 
dorsal-stream activity for both immediate and delayed tasks. This was true for healthy observers and 
also for the patient suffering from optic ataxia (Himmelbach et al., 2009). Thus, neither single-unit 
recordings on monkeys nor evidence from fMRI studies on humans provide support for the 
presumed transient nature of dorsal stream activity or for the claim that tasks requiring actions to 
remembered visual targets induce a switch from dorsal to ventral-stream control of action.  
However, such findings cannot preclude a modified version of the dorsal amnesia hypothesis. This 
modified version suggests that while the dorsal-stream on its own cannot maintain visual 
representations, it can support memory-guided action with additional input from ventral stream 
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areas. This model can reconcile the neuropsychological findings from DF (ventral stream damage) 
with the fMRI results obtained in healthy participants. DF’s apparent failure to perform normally in 
memory-guided action conditions is explained by the fact that the ventral input to the dorsal stream, 
which becomes crucial during a memory-guided action, is missing or at least severely compromised. 
The finding of sustained fMRI activity in dorsal stream areas in neurologically intact humans is 
explained by assuming that this activity depends on input from the ventral stream. In fact, support 
for this modified hypothesis has been reported by Singhal, Monaco, Kaufman, and Culham (2013). 
Specifically, Singhal and colleagues (2013) found re-emerging activity in the ventral stream (area LO) 
around the time the delayed motor response was initiated. They suggested that the re-activation of 
ventral area LO constitutes support for the claim that during delayed action, visual input from the 
ventral stream becomes critical for successful visuomotor performance. There are, however, two 
reasons why one might be hesitant to accept this interpretation. Firstly, claims of a temporal 
correlation between behaviour and BOLD activity have to be treated with caution given the multi-
second lag that characterizes the relationship between neuronal activity and its correlated BOLD 
signal. Secondly, and more importantly, Singhal et al.’s (2013) interpretation of their data presumes 
a false dichotomy. They contrast two possibilities: (1) both immediate and delayed actions are 
served exclusively by the dorsal stream or (2) immediate actions are served by the dorsal stream and 
delayed actions are served by both the dorsal and the ventral stream. The fact that ventral-stream 
activation is found in the delayed action condition is taken as evidence that option (2) is correct. 
However, this reasoning does not take into consideration the existence of another plausible third 
possibility: Immediate and delayed actions are both served by information from dorsal and ventral 
sources. This third possibility is not ruled out by the fMRI findings showing ventral activation during 
delayed action and it is in fact the one which we find most plausible and which also received some 
support from recent fMRI studies showing that area LO is indeed involved in the immediate 
processing of grasp relevant object properties such as object weight and size (Gallivan, Cant, 
Goodale, & Flanagan, 2014; Monaco et al., 2014). Thus, conclusive evidence against option (3) and 
for option (2) would require finding ventral activity for delayed actions only but not for immediate 
actions, but this yet has to be demonstrated.  
Given the relatively poor temporal resolution of the fMRI method, transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) might provide a better option to test the idea that the ventral stream is crucially involved in 
visuomotor behaviour based on memorized visual information. TMS allows us to temporarily 
interfere with the function of a given brain area and to study the effect of such interference on a 
given type of behaviour. In case of the (modified or unmodified) dorsal amnesia hypothesis, we 
would expect that interference in area LO, the visual form area in the ventral stream, should disrupt 
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specifically memory-based visuomotor behaviour. Rice-Cohen and colleagues (2009) tested this 
prediction using double-pulse TMS over LO (ventral stream) and AIP (dorsal stream). They reported 
that TMS over AIP affected both immediate and delayed grasping while only delayed grasping was 
affected by TMS over LO. At first glance, these findings seem to support the modified dorsal amnesia 
hypothesis, i.e. the dorsal stream is involved in both types of action, whereas the ventral stream 
contributes only to memory-based action. A more careful look at the findings casts however doubt 
on this interpretation. In the context of the perception-action model, the grasping response is 
typically considered the visuomotor equivalent of a size-discrimination judgement and the maximum 
opening of the hand during the grasp or the Maximum Grip Aperture (MGA) is seen as the 
visuomotor equivalent of a size-judgement (see for example, Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; 
Ganel, Chajut, & Algom, 2008; Goodale et al., 1991). Following this logic, we would expect that 
MGAs (or more precisely the relationship between MGAs and object size) are used to judge whether 
a given area is involved in the visual guidance of grasping or not. However, the only variables which 
were significantly affected by TMS in the study by Rice-Cohen and colleagues (2009) were peak 
grasping velocity (i.e. the speed with which the hand was opening during the grasp) and the 
normalized time at which this peak occurred. Peak grasping velocity was increased when TMS was 
applied over LO during the delayed-grasping condition, and this peak occurred earlier when TMS was 
applied over AIP. It remains to be explained why disruption of the very area that presumably 
provides the relevant visual target information for the grasping response should have no significant 
effect on MGAs but result in a speeding up of the hand-opening response and shift the velocity peak 
of that response to an earlier time point. To sum up, the findings from the study by Rice-Cohen and 
colleagues (2009) are certainly intriguing but their meaning is not yet clear. 
TMS is, however, not the only approach that can be used to study the contribution of the ventral 
stream to memory-based action. If temporary disruption of the ventral stream is expected to 
interfere with memory-based action, permanent damage to the ventral stream should certainly 
cause a profound difficulty in this domain. We will turn to this prediction in the next section.  
 
2. Trapped in the present. How ventral-stream damage affects memory-based action. 
The conclusion that ventral stream damage impairs the ability to perform memory-based 
visuomotor acts received initial support from a classic study conducted by Goodale and his 
colleagues (1994). In this study, DF was first asked to grasp target objects placed in front of her. Her 
ability to adjust her hand-opening to the objects’ size seemed normal. Next, she was again asked to 
grasp objects but this time vision of the target object was removed as well as the object itself. After 
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a delay of 2 seconds, she was prompted to perform a grasping movement directed at the initially 
presented target object which was no longer on the table. It turned out that in this condition her 
performance was significantly worse than that of healthy control participants (Goodale, Jakobson, et 
al., 1994).  
More evidence for DF’s failure to produce accurate memory-based visuomotor responses was 
reported for pointing to visual targets as well as for making eye-movements to visual targets (Milner, 
Dijkerman, & Carey, 1999; Rossit, Szymanek, Butler, & Harvey, 2010). However, at least in the case 
of the delayed grasping study, there is an obvious confound that might just as well account for DF’s 
poor performance. While DF was waiting for the tone signalling the start of her grasping movement, 
the target object was physically removed from the table. Thus, DF had to pretend (or pantomime) a 
grasping movement and had to return to the start position without having had the chance to touch 
the real object and thus to compare her initial guess with the haptic information received when 
touching the real object. In short, Goodale et al.’s (1994) grasping study compared a condition of 
real grasping and real haptic feedback with a condition using a delay and requiring a pantomime 
grasp that prevented haptic feedback. So the question arises, if it is possible that the lack of haptic 
feedback rather than the need to consult memorized visual information may account for DF’s poor 
performance. Schenk (2012a, 2012b) addressed this question. DF had to perform a grasping task 
with the target object presented in a mirror setup. The target object was visible but perceived at its 
mirror position. At the mirror position a real object was placed in some conditions, but not in others. 
This setup ensured that the visual target information was always available, even in conditions where 
no real object was present. As a consequence, it was possible to dissociate the availability of visual 
target information from the availability of haptic target information. As expected, DF produced 
normal reach-to-grasp movements when both visual and haptic information were available. 
However, her performance dropped to chance level when the haptic information was withdrawn 
(Schenk, 2012a, 2012b)3. These findings suggest that it may have been the lack of haptic feedback 
                                                          
3 One reviewer asked us to comment on a study by Whitwell, Milner, Cavina-Pratesi, Byrne, and Goodale 
(2014) that challenged Schenk’s (2012a, b) interpretation of the influence of haptic feedback on DF’s grasping 
performance. They contrasted two interpretations: the calibration hypothesis (Schenk, 2012a, b) and the touch 
hypothesis (Milner, Ganel, & Goodale, 2012). The calibration hypothesis claims that DF uses haptic feedback to 
calibrate the visual information used for grasping; the touch-hypothesis assumes that it is the mere contact 
with a real object that will lead to the involvement of the dorsal stream and improves DF’s grasping 
performance. In other words, the calibration hypothesis assumes that the haptic information must be 
informative about object size whereas the touch hypothesis predicts that non-informative haptic feedback will 
also improve DF’s performance. Whitwell and colleagues (2014) employed a mirror-setup to decouple the 
visual and haptic properties of target objects. In one condition, the visual size of the target object varied but its 
haptic size remained constant. DF’s grasping performance in this condition remained within the normal range. 
Whitwell and colleagues (2014) took this as evidence for the touch-hypothesis. We would like to make two 
comments. First this debate is not really relevant to the issue at hand. The fact that DF’s performance is 
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rather than the introduction of the delay that caused DF’s poor performance in Goodale et al.’s 
(1994) delayed grasping task4. More importantly these findings show the need for a study that 
examines the impact of temporal delays and haptic feedback on DF’s visuomotor behaviour 
independently from each other. A few years ago, we used a posting paradigm to address this issue 
(Hesse & Schenk, 2014). In this paradigm, participants were asked to post a hand-held card into a 
slot whose orientation varied from trial to trial. This task was contrasted with an orientation-
matching task, where participants rotated the hand-held card to match its orientation with that of 
the slot (see also Hesse, Franz, & Schenk, 2011 for a discussion of this paradigm). This is the same 
paradigm Milner and colleagues (1991) used to demonstrate DF’s failure in orientation-matching (i.e. 
the perceptual task) but her near-normal behaviour in posting (i.e. the visuomotor task). We 
employed the same contrast but added a few additional conditions in which we manipulated the 
availability of visual feedback and the duration of the delay between the disappearance of the target 
information and the initiation of the posting movement. Surprisingly, all these careful manipulations 
of delay and visual feedback proved to be irrelevant. DF performed without error in all tested 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
impaired when no real object is present remains undisputed. Accordingly, the fact that Goodale, Jakobson, et 
al. (1994) confounded the introduction of a delay with the removal of the target object in their 
neuropsychological studies on delayed grasping remains problematic regardless of how we explain the 
detrimental effect of removing the physical object. Secondly, the findings by Whitwell and colleagues (2014) 
do not provide compelling support for the touch hypothesis since both touch and calibration hypothesis 
predict normal grasping performance in the constant-haptic size condition albeit for different reasons. The 
touch hypothesis assumes that informative haptic feedback is irrelevant for accurate grip scaling. The 
calibration hypothesis predicts that the experience of a constant haptic size in the face of varying visual size 
will convince participants of the irrelevance of the visual information. Hence, they will give less weight to the 
available visual information which will in turn weaken the relationship between visual size and grasp 
performance (as measured by the slope of that linear function). This is expected to happen for DF and controls 
alike and thus DF’s performance will remain within the normal range. A further problem of Whitwell et al.’s 
study (2014) relates to DF’s performance in the corresponding visual-size estimation task. When considering 
the absolute value of the slope linking real visual size and DF’s estimated size, her performance in the 
perceptual task is better than in any of the grasping tasks. This poses a problem for the entire logic of the 
study. We cannot use good performance in a grasping task as indication of dorsal-stream involvement if DF 
performs just as well or even better in tasks that are assumed to be reliant on her impaired ventral stream. 
Finally, the data-set presented by Whitwell and colleagues (2014) is not consistent. Depending on the object 
used and the performance measures employed qualitatively different results were obtained. In short, Whitwell 
et al.’s (2014) findings cannot be used to support or reject either the calibration or the touch hypothesis. 
 
4 Please note that the same critique also applies to a study by Rossit, Fraser, Teasell, Malhotra, and Goodale 
(2011). Rossit and colleagues examined the grasping performance of a patient suffering from unilateral 
neglect. Immediate and delayed grasping movements were compared. The patient was impaired in the 
delayed but not in the immediate condition. As in the study by Goodale et al. (1994), the target object was 
removed at the onset of the delay interval. This meant that participants grasped a real object and received 
haptic feedback in the immediate condition but not in the delayed condition. Thus, again it may have been the 
lack of haptic feedback rather than the need to memorize the visual size of the object that caused the neglect 
patient’s impaired grasping performance. This explanation is further supported by findings from our recent 
study (Utz et al., submitted) demonstrating neglect patients’ increased reliance on sensory feedback even for 
visuomotor task where the visual target does not have to be memorized.  
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immediate and delayed posting conditions. Only in the orientation-matching condition her 
performance fell outside the normal range. This finding shows that, contrary to the predictions of 
the dorsal amnesia hypothesis, not all memory-based visuomotor behaviour is impaired by ventral 
stream damage. This means the claim that any normal memory-based visuomotor action is 
impossible with a damaged ventral stream is refuted and thus one of the main pieces of evidence for 
both the original and the revised dorsal amnesia hypothesis has been eliminated.  
Some readers might feel that this conclusion is somewhat immoderate. Evidence for problems in 
delayed actions has been provided in three different behavioural paradigms: grasping, pointing and 
voluntary, saccadic eye-movements. This evidence it seems cannot be negated by just one failure to 
obtain the same result in a single type of visuomotor behaviour, i.e. posting. However, in our opinion 
the evidentiary status of supporting and challenging studies is not equivalent in this context. 
Supporting studies are less conclusive than dissenting studies for several reasons. The first reason 
relates to a simple point of logic. A hypothesis that makes a universal claim, e.g. all actions based on 
visual memory are impaired when the ventral system is impaired, stands refuted as soon as a single 
convincing and contradicting instance has been demonstrated. The second reason relates to the fact 
that techniques used to remove visual target information frequently interfere with the availability of 
other sensory information that participants typically use in guiding their actions. Accordingly, we 
cannot be sure that it is actually the withdrawal of visual target information that accounts for the 
compromised performance. We already mentioned haptic feedback as one source of sensory 
information that is available in real-time action tasks but has usually been withdrawn in delayed-
action experiments (see for example: Goodale et al., 1994; Rossit et al. 2011).  
Another source of information that differs between full-vision and delay conditions is the availability 
of visual feedback. The ability to see one’s hand during reaching and grasping and to compare the 
hand position relative to the target position has been found to greatly and reliably improve the 
accuracy of the action (Hesse & Franz, 2009; Jakobson & Goodale, 1991; Westwood, Heath, et al., 
2001; Wing, Turton, & Fraser, 1986). In fact, Hesse & Franz (2009) showed that movements are 
considerably less accurate when vision is occluded at movement onset (open-loop) as compared to 
full vision conditions (closed-loop), while further delays up to 5 s have comparably smaller effects. In 
a recent study, we also showed that the availability of visual feedback might explain why neglect 
patients were found to consistently perform worse in anti-pointing tasks (i.e. task that requires them 
to point to a mirror-symmetric position of a presented target) as compared to standard pro-pointing 
tasks (Utz et al., submitted). That is, whenever patients were able to see both their hand and the 
target, they perform better in pro-pointing tasks as compared to anti-pointing tasks. However, this 
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difference in performance between the two tasks disappeared when visual feedback was occluded 
suggesting that visual feedback can be used effectively to correct pro-pointing movements but not 
anti-pointing movements. This is quite unsurprising as visual feedback during pro-pointing allows us 
to compare the visual target position with the intended movement position and to use any 
discrepancy to correct potential movement errors (Saunders & Knill, 2003; 2005, see also section 4). 
In contrast, the two locations are spatially dissociated in anti-pointing and hence there is no 
informative error signal. Importantly, these findings are of specific relevance for interpreting the 
observation that neglect patients were found to show impaired performance for delayed but not for 
immediate pointing compared to healthy control subjects (Rossit et al., 2009). If we assume that 
visual feedback is used to correct pointing movements in the closed-loop condition but is unavailable 
after delay this could potentially explain why neglect patients show normal performance in 
immediate pointing tasks and impaired performance in delayed pointing tasks. In short, we would 
argue that given that neglect patients produce significant errors when visual feedback is unavailable 
(Utz et al., submitted), normal performance can only be expected when effective error-correcting 
strategies are available (i.e. during closed-loop pro-pointing). 
Similarly, another final potentially confounding factor that is relevant in this context is the 
availability of environmental information. Regarding the finding that DF shows impaired 
performance in delayed pointing and eye-movement tasks, we recently found some indication that 
this impairment may partly relate to the fact that she is unable to use environmental (landmark) 
information as efficiently as healthy participants. Visual landmarks are important cues in spatial 
visual memory tasks (Burgess, Spiers, & Paleologou, 2004). They can, however, only be effectively 
used when the relevant objects and their positions can be coded relative to them. This type of 
coding, called scene-based or allocentric visual coding, is impaired in DF (Dijkerman, Milner, & Carey, 
1998; Schenk, 2006). It is therefore possible that DF’s poor performance in some delayed-action 
tasks might reflect an inability to use landmarks rather than an inability to retrieve target 
information from visual memory. We recently found evidence to support this interpretation. 
Specifically, we observed that if landmark information was available during and after the delay 
period DF’s performance was indeed worse than that of control participants. In contrast, she 
performed equally well as control participants in delay conditions where only egocentric information 
was available (Hesse & Schenk, 2014).  
In summary, we argue that neuropsychological studies suggesting dissociations between delayed 
and immediate actions are inconclusive since the interventions used to introduce a delay also 
interfered with other sensory information relevant for accurate motor performance. In addition, 
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finding that patient DF, a patient with extensive ventral stream damage, is still able to produce 
normal visuomotor performance under delay-conditions provides a serious challenge to the dorsal 
amnesia hypothesis and its claim that no normal memory-based visuomotor action is possible 
without an intact ventral stream.  
Does this mean that we should abandon the dorsal amnesia hypothesis? This might seem too hasty 
at this point. There is still the puzzling finding of the delay-induced paradoxical improvement in 
patients with optic ataxia. As we noted above, this is a finding that is not predicted by any other 
model or hypothesis, and so far it seems that only the dorsal amnesia hypothesis can provide a 
satisfactory explanation for it. In the next section, we will summarize and critically discuss the 
findings on paradoxical improvement in optic ataxia.  
3. Stuck in the past: How dorsal-stream damage affects memory-based action. 
Optic ataxia is a comparatively rare but very interesting and to some extent puzzling disorder. First 
described by Bálint (1909) it forms part of the so-called Balint-Holmes syndrome which is sometimes 
observed in the context of neuronal damage to posterior portions of the parietal cortex (Goethals & 
Santens, 2001). This type of neuronal damage can occur as a result of stroke but also in the course of 
neurodegenerative disorders such as posterior cortical atrophy, a form of dementia. Patients with 
Balint-Holmes syndrome have a narrow and restricted attentional field. As a result, they will find it 
difficult to appreciate the visual context in pictures, typically focusing on local features and thereby 
ignoring the global form of a line drawing (Goethals & Santens, 2001; Kerkhoff & Heldmann, 1999). 
Furthermore, they will misreach when aiming for visual targets. It is this last symptom that is 
referred to by the term “optic ataxia”. Optic ataxia can be found in isolation, and it has been 
reported after unilateral or bilateral damage to the posterior parietal cortex. Very few cases show 
signs of misreaching when they are allowed to move their eyes freely and to directly gaze at a target 
object. Instead it is much more typical that the problems are restricted to conditions where the 
patient has to look at one position while reaching for a target presented at a different position and 
hence in visual periphery (Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). In fact, Borchers and colleagues argued that 
this aspect of optic ataxia (misreaching in visual periphery) is the most reliable criterion to 
distinguish optic ataxia from other motor disorders (Borchers et al., 2013). As the severity of the 
problems can depend on the tested hemifield (left or right) and the tested arm (left vs. right), optic 
ataxia is a disorder which seems neither perceptual nor motor but a disorder of transforming visual 
input into motor output. It is thus considered to be a paradigmatic visuomotor disorder. Given this 
description, it is hardly surprising that the perception-action model presents optic ataxia as a 
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representative example of dorsal stream damage (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Optic ataxia therefore 
provides the perfect opportunity to test the dorsal amnesia hypothesis.  
According to the dorsal amnesia hypothesis, information about the visual target in the dorsal stream 
decays rapidly after the target has been removed from sight (Goodale, Króliczak, & Westwood, 2005, 
p.273; Milner & Goodale, 2006, pp. 173, 174, 245ff). In optic ataxia the dorsal stream is damaged 
and the information in the dorsal stream is therefore compromised. However, when information in 
the dorsal stream is unavailable after delay, the motor system will take its visual input from the 
ventral stream that maintains visual representations for longer time periods (Milner and Goodale, 
2006, p. 246). The ventral stream is preserved in optic ataxia and consequently its visual 
representations are available for action guidance. Thus, it can be expected that patients with optic 
ataxia will perform significantly better when they respond to memorized target information. Milner 
and his colleagues tested this idea in several studies and confirmed the prediction both for reaching 
and grasping behaviour (Milner, Dijkerman, McIntosh, Rossetti, & Pisella, 2003; Milner et al., 2001; 
Milner, Paulignan, et al., 1999). However, they pushed their hypothesis one step further.  
If patients suffering from optic ataxia become reliant on stored visual information from the ventral 
stream, they might in fact use this stored information even when more current information is 
available. In one study which tested this prediction, the patient was asked to grasp an object; one 
object was presented at the start of the trial, vision of the object was then occluded for a few 
seconds, after which vision was restored such that the patient was again able to see a target and was 
prompted to reach forward and grasp it. In one condition, the object presented after the delay 
period was identical to the one presented before (same-condition) whereas in a second condition, a 
new object was placed in front of the patient (different condition). This new object could either be 
smaller or bigger than the one which was seen at the beginning of the trial. This study produced two 
interesting observations: Firstly, performance in the same condition was better than in a standard 
grasping task even though in both conditions the current target object was right in front of the 
patient’s eyes at the time the grasping movement was initiated. Secondly, when a new object was 
presented after the delay period, the patient still seemed to adjust his grip to the size of the old 
object rather than to the size of the new and current target object (Milner et al., 2003; Milner, 
Paulignan, et al., 1999). Both observations seemed to confirm the idea that patients with optic ataxia 
are somehow stuck in the past and rely for their visuomotor behaviour on stored visual information, 
even when more current and relevant visual information is available. Taken together, these studies 
seem to demonstrate in a remarkable way that the perception-action model, and more specifically 
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the dorsal amnesia hypothesis, inspires some interesting questions and is able to correctly predict 
some truly unexpected findings.  
Importantly, it appears that only the perception-action model can provide a satisfactory explanation 
for those remarkable findings. Proponents of the perception-action model, therefore, challenge their 
critics to come up with alternative accounts – accounts which do not include the assumption of 
distinct pathways for perception and action (Westwood & Goodale, 2011). However, in our opinion, 
this is only a fair and relevant challenge if the perception-action model itself provides a satisfactory 
account for these observations. If this is not the case, these observations favour neither the 
proponents’ nor the critics’ view and are therefore irrelevant to the debate. Thus, the important 
question to ask here is whether or not the perception-action model can explain why patients with 
optic ataxia perform better after delay and why they seem to be stuck in the past when using visual 
information for action guidance?  
Let us first look at the stuck-in-the-past findings and in particular at the condition where the objects 
prior and after delay are identical. The patient’s performance in this task is better than when he is 
asked to grasp the object immediately without a delay. Is this really the behaviour that would be 
predicted by the dorsal amnesia hypothesis? The short answer needs to be: “No”. The original 
version of the dorsal amnesia hypothesis predicts that a switch to ventral stream input, and thus 
paradoxical improvement for the patient, occurs when at the time of movement initiation no 
concurrent visual information is available. The patient, however, showed improvement in the 
presence of concurrent visual information. Milner and colleagues (2001) argued that in this 
condition the system will choose to pick the memorized information because it comes from the 
ventral stream, and will therefore be unaffected by dorsal damage. However, if the system has the 
capability to choose which visual information to use for action guidance why does it not exercise this 
capability also in the immediate grasping condition using the visual information from the intact 
ventral rather than from the damaged dorsal system? This assumption of the system’s ability to 
choose visual information on the basis of expected informational quality becomes even more 
problematic when we consider the performance of the patient in the condition where two different 
objects are presented before and after the delay. In this condition, the patient seems to base his 
motor response on outdated memorised information and adjusts his grip to the earlier object. Thus, 
the patient uses information that is clearly less accurate than the information presently available in 
both the dorsal and ventral stream areas. This is truly surprising behaviour and it should also be 
surprising to the proponents of the perception-action model. Firstly, if the absence of available 
visual information in the dorsal stream triggers the switch to ventral stream input for action 
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guidance there should be no switch when concurrent visual information is available. If, however, the 
switch to ventral stream input is based on informational quality, then we would expect that the 
system would use the ventral visual information about the current object and not information about 
the no longer relevant earlier object. Thus, under both assumptions it is hard to understand why the 
patient’s performance is affected by outdated object information.  
The difficulty to accommodate the stuck-in-the-past finding within the perception-action framework 
becomes yet clearer when we contrast two possible explanatory scenarios. It seems clear that the 
patient’s grasp after the delay reflects the target information from before the delay. This reliance on 
outdated visual information presented before the delay can be explained in two different ways. 
Either the motor act is prepared after the delay but instead of using the current information, stored 
visual information from before the delay is used. Or alternatively, the motor act could be prepared 
before the delay and not be updated at the time of movement initiation. Both scenarios result in the 
same outcome: the resulting motor response is adjusted to visual information from the previous 
object. Thus, both scenarios could in principle explain the stuck-in-the-past finding. In the following, 
we will argue that regardless of which scenario is considered, problems for the dorsal amnesia 
hypothesis arise.  
The first option (“prepare later but retrieve from before”) seems rather unlikely. In this scenario, the 
motor act is prepared when both new relevant and old outdated information are available. Why 
should the system retrieve outdated and irrelevant visual information when new and relevant 
information is available in both the ventral and the dorsal pathways? And if the system of the 
patient with optic ataxia has no choice in that matter and is destined to only ever use outdated 
information from visual memory shouldn’t this reliance on stored information also be observed in 
other situations? For example, would it not be expected that the reaching and grasping behaviour in 
standard experiments without delays reflects the position or object size from the previous trial and 
not that from the current trial? Clearly this is not what has been found. At least for reaching 
behaviour it is obvious that the reach reflects the current target position, albeit imperfectly, and not 
the target position from a previous trial. A glance at the findings from a number of studies on 
patients with optic ataxia confirms that while these patients make significant errors - and typically 
errors that increase with the eccentricity of the visual target -, the target position and reaching 
position are nevertheless well correlated (see for example, Himmelbach & Karnath, 2005; Perenin & 
Vighetto, 1988). Such a close quantitative relationship between target and movement is unlikely to 
emerge if in a randomized sequence of trials the current response of the patients was in fact linked 
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to the target of the previous trial. To put it bluntly the “prepare later but retrieve from before” 
account is implausible and contradicts other findings from optic ataxia patients.  
Let us therefore turn to the second possible account (“prepare earlier but fail to update”). According 
to this account, the patient prepares the motor act when the first object is presented. This motor act 
is then stored during the delay period. When, after the delay, the new object is presented the 
patient fails to notice the difference and consequently executes an action based on outdated visual 
information. This option avoids the problems of the first account. Moreover, it is a plausible account 
given that there is evidence for patients with optic ataxia failing to update ongoing visuomotor acts 
on the basis of new and action-relevant information (Pisella et al., 2000). On the basis of the second 
account, it is also easier to understand why optic ataxia patients may fail to update a motor act in a 
delayed reaching task but are still able to direct their next movement to a novel target and not to 
the target of the previous trial in a standard non-delayed reaching task. The assumption is that the 
execution of the prepared movement will bring the whole sensorimotor process to its natural 
conclusion, and for the next trial the system will start the process of motor preparation anew. 
Considering all this, the second account seems more plausible and more consistent with available 
empirical evidence. Nevertheless, it carries an implication which undermines the conventional logic 
underlying the dorsal amnesia hypothesis and its predictions. The stored-motor-act account implies 
that prepared motor acts can and will be stored when a delay is introduced between target 
presentation and response initiation. This means that the motor system does not have to refer back 
to the content of the ventral stream’s visual memory to bridge the delay, instead it relies on a stored 
motor act that has already been prepared on the basis of visual information presented before the 
delay. Hence, within this framework, delayed actions would not be more reliant on ventral stream 
input than non-delayed actions. Accordingly, an improvement of movements performed by patients 
with optic ataxia after delay would ironically no longer be expected or predicted. 
Thus, upon detailed analysis, the stuck-in-the past finding appears to be rather hard to reconcile 
with the perception-action model. In fact, the proponents of the model seem to be faced with an 
unattractive choice between an implausible account with implications contradicted by the patients’ 
everyday behaviour and a more plausible account that undermines the very logic previously used in 
support of the dorsal amnesia hypothesis. Moreover, the stuck-in-the past finding is not the only 
problem for the dorsal amnesia hypothesis in the context of optic ataxia. This hypothesis assumes 
that actions are based on visual information from the dorsal stream if and only if vision is available at 
the time the movement is programmed (Goodale et al., 2005). Hence, it is expected that if 
neurologically healthy participants or patients with dorsal stream lesions execute actions after a 
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delay, these should be based completely on visual information coming from the ventral stream. 
Consequently, visuomotor performance of patients with dorsal stream damage should be no worse 
and no better than the performance of healthy participants operating under the same delayed 
condition. Again this is not what has been found. In those studies where paradoxical improvements 
in delay conditions were observed, the performance of patients with optic ataxia after delay was 
mostly improved (but not always, see for example Khan et al., 2005) but never came near normal 
performance (see for example Himmelbach et al., 2009; Milner, Paulignan, et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, the performance pattern found in another patient with optic ataxia after right-
hemispheric lesion was decidedly mixed with regard to how delay affected movement accuracy 
(Revol et al., 2003). The effect of delay on behaviour depended on both the hemifield tested and the 
performance measure adopted. Delay reduced the variable error in the left visual hemifield but not 
the right. More importantly, while the variable error was reduced by delay in some conditions, the 
amplitude error was increased by delay in most conditions (Revol et al., 2003). It is not obvious how 
the dorsal amnesia hypothesis can account for this combination of results. 
So the question arises if maybe the modified dorsal amnesia hypothesis as suggested by Singhal et 
al. (2013) fares any better. This is not at all clear. With respect to the delay-induced paradoxical 
improvement, it is not even clear whether such an improvement would be predicted by the modified 
version given the underlying assumption that during delay ventral stream input is injected into a 
damaged dorsal stream. In fact, it is difficult to derive predictions without specifying more precisely 
how the ventral and dorsal-stream processes interact during a delayed-action condition, and how 
this interaction is affected by dorsal stream damage. With respect to the stuck-in-the past finding we 
can be more specific. It is clear that the dorsal-amnesia modification as suggested by Singhal et al. 
(2013) contains no provision that allows it to explain why patients with optic ataxia recruit outdated 
information from visual memory when more recent information is available in both ventral and 
dorsal stream areas. 
In summary, the surprising behaviour that patients with optic ataxia show when asked to interact 
with memorized visual targets cannot be used to support the dorsal amnesia hypothesis as it turns 
out that the findings, when looked at in more detail, are actually inconsistent with the assumptions 
and predictions of the perception-action model.  
So far, we have focused on neuroscientific and neuropsychological evidence for the dorsal-amnesia 
hypothesis. However, there is also a large body of research on the relationship between visual 
memory and action control in healthy individuals. Some of those findings predated the advent of the 
perception-action model by several years and probably contributed to the adoption of the dorsal 
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amnesia hypothesis as part of the perception-action model. In the following, we want to briefly 
review whether the evidence obtained from healthy individuals requires the dorsal amnesia 
hypothesis or whether it can be explained without recourse to the two-visual pathway hypothesis.  
4. Dorsal amnesia: How reliance on memory impairs actions in neurologically intact humans  
An interesting consequence of the formulation of the perception-action model (Goodale & Milner, 
1992; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 2006) was an increased arousal of interest in the 
investigation of the relationship between visual factors and manual control, a topic that had been 
until then largely neglected by psychologists (see, Rosenbaum, 2005). Interestingly, however, it is 
often ignored that the question of how humans use visual information to control voluntary 
movements has been raised by a number of researchers well before the perception-action model 
was first formulated (e.g., Bowditch & Southard, 1882; Elliott & Allard, 1985; Elliott & Madalena, 
1987; Thomson, 1980; Thomson, 1983; Woodworth, 1899). In his now classic studies Woodworth 
(1899) could show that visually-guided hand movements (consisting of drawing lines of different 
lengths) get more inaccurate when they have to be performed very quickly. In contrast, when 
movements were made with the eyes shut, the correlation between speed and accuracy was absent 
with errors staying at a similar and relatively high level throughout different movement speeds. 
Woodworth suggested that goal-directed hand movements consistent of two successive phases: 1) 
the initial adjustment, which is ballistic and largely unaffected by the availability of visual 
information and 2) the phase of current control in which visual feedback is used to reduce the end-
point error toward the end of the movement. Hence, the higher inaccuracy for visually-guided 
movements performed at high speeds was attributed to the fact that speed interfered with the 
current control phase, thus preventing finer adjustments in the end phase of the movement. In 
contrast, if movements are performed with the eyes shut, they rely primarily on the phase of initial 
adjustment (driven by the kinaesthetic sense) while no current control, based on visual information, 
can occur. Even though Woodworth (1899) already speculated that movements performed in the 
absence of vision may rely to some extent on visual memory of the target location, the spatial and 
temporal properties of these underlying visual representations were not systematically investigated 
until about 80 years later (Thomson, 1980; Thomson, 1983).  
In his studies, Thomson investigated how humans use visual information to control locomotion. In a 
series of experiments, he varied the length of the time interval between the occlusion of vision and 
reaching a target. He could show that accurate guidance (over longer distances) was possible for 
about 8 seconds after visual occlusion. After this critical time interval, performance was observed to 
deteriorate rapidly. Thomson hypothesised that movements were based upon an internal (most 
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likely visual) image of the environment being available for a limited amount of time before fading 
out of short-term memory. However, a short-coming of these walking experiments was that walking 
distance and the time needed to reach the target were confounded (the issue was partly addressed 
by introducing conditions in which participants had to run to the target hence covering a larger 
distance in shorter time). Furthermore, a later study by Elliott (1986) failed to replicate Thomson’s 
findings, instead suggesting that humans may rely on continuous visual information to control their 
movements accurately. In order to address this inconsistency between studies, Elliot and colleagues 
conducted a series of experiments systematically investigating the effect of delay on goal-directed 
reaching movements (e.g., Elliott, Calvert, Jaeger, & Jones, 1990; Elliott, Carson, Goodman, & Chua, 
1991; Elliott & Lee, 1995; Elliott & Madalena, 1987).  
In line with previous studies (Elliott & Allard, 1985; Keele & Posner, 1968; Zelaznik, Hawkins, & 
Kisselburgh, 1983), Elliott and Madalena (1987) observed that the pointing error increased in 
conditions in which no visual feedback of the hand and the target was available (open-loop) as 
compared to conditions in which movements were performed with full visual feedback (closed-
loop). Strikingly, however, accuracy deteriorated considerably when a 2 second delay was 
introduced while the effect of longer delays (up to 10 seconds) was comparably negligible (see also, 
Heath & Binsted, 2007; Heath & Westwood, 2003). Based on their finding, they suggested that in the 
absence of direct visual input a relatively accurate visual representation of the environment, 
contained in some kind of visual (iconic) memory, persists for a period of up to 2 seconds after visual 
occlusion. Even though Elliott and colleagues later stated that the visual presentation underlying the 
control of rapid limb movements may decay continuously and more rapidly than originally assumed 
(Elliott & Calvert, 1990; Elliott et al., 1990), the exact decay characteristics remained unclear.  
Interestingly, the suggestion that accurate visual representations are available for up to 2 seconds 
after visual occlusion was initially adopted by the perception-action model (Hu, Eagleson, & 
Goodale, 1999; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner, Paulignan, et al., 1999). The proponents of the 
perception-action model, however, linked the finding that movement kinematics change 
considerably (less accurate and more variable) when delayed actions are performed to the idea that 
these movements do not rely on a current visual representation processed by the visuomotor 
mechanisms of the dorsal stream but rely instead on a stored visual representation of the object and 
its location which is processed by the perceptual mechanisms of the ventral stream. Yet again, none 
of these studies systematically examined the time frame over which the visual representations used 
to program the movements decayed (i.e., all studies applied delays of more than 2 seconds). The 
issue of how visual information used for movement programming decays during the first two 
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seconds of visual occlusion was first addressed in a series of experiments by Westwood and 
colleagues (Heath, Westwood, & Binsted, 2004; Westwood, Heath, et al., 2001; Westwood, Heath, & 
Roy, 2003). In one of their first studies in which Westwood, Heath, et al. (2001) investigated the 
accuracy of reaching movements after brief pre-response delays (durations of 500 ms, 1000 ms,  
1500 ms and 2000 ms), they could show that the radial error was significantly larger whenever a 
delayed movement was required (as compared to closed-loop and open-loop reaching). Remarkably, 
the length of the delay had no effect on the pointing error suggesting that even after only 500 ms 
movements were programmed based on the stored (and less accurate but more durable) perceptual 
representation. More importantly, in a follow-up study, Westwood et al. (2003) introduced a “brief-
delay” condition in which vision of the target and the moving hand was occluded simultaneously 
with the go-signal that signalled participants to start their movements. That is, the difference 
between the brief-delay condition and the classical open-loop condition (in which vision is usually 
occluded at movement onset) was just in whether or not participants were able to perceive the 
target during the movement programming phase (reaction time interval). The finding that 
movement kinematics in the brief delay condition were significantly different to those in the open-
loop condition (and resembled movements performed after longer delays; see also Heath and 
Binsted (2007)) led the authors to the conclusion that the visuomotor system operates in real-time. 
Hence, these studies formed the basis and first (behavioural) evidence for the notion that dorsal 
stream information is only used to support movement programming when direct visual input is 
available at the time of movement planning. In the absence of direct visual input, movements were 
assumed to rely on the stored representations of the environment maintained within the perceptual 
networks of the ventral pathway (real-time hypothesis of motor programming). In other words, 
according to this view, the visuomotor system does not store any target information at all and has 
no access to highly accurate information about the environment for any time following visual 
occlusion.  
Given that the real-time hypothesis suggests that there is an immediate change in the processing 
mechanisms underlying the visuomotor control of our actions following visual occlusion, one would 
assume that the transition from one source of information (dorsal) to another (ventral) will become 
apparent in a sudden step-wise increase in movement errors. Specifically, the real-time hypothesis 
would predict that movement programming is based on accurate real-time information as long as 
the target is visible until movement initiation. Thus, movements performed in closed-loop and open-
loop conditions should be of similar accuracy. Overall, a review of the literature reveals that findings 
are mixed, with the majority of studies showing that the elimination of visual feedback at movement 
onset strongly affects reaching and grasping kinematics (e.g., Elliott & Calvert, 1990; Franz, Hesse, & 
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Kollath, 2009; Hesse & Franz, 2009, 2010; Jakobson & Goodale, 1991) while other studies suggest 
that it has no or only very little effect (e.g., Hu et al., 1999; Jeannerod, 1984; Winges, Weber, & 
Santello, 2003).  
Furthermore, and more importantly, the real-time hypothesis predicts that movement kinematics 
change considerably between conditions in which either vision is available during movement 
initiation (open-loop after movement initiation [OL-Move]) or in which vision is occluded 
simultaneously with the “go-signal” (open-loop after go-signal [OL-Signal]). There are only few 
studies that tested this prediction directly and again their findings are inconsistent. While some 
studies suggest, in line with the real-time hypothesis, that OL-Move and OL-Signal conditions are 
very different from each other, with OL-Signal conditions being very similar to conditions introducing 
longer delays (Heath & Binsted, 2007; Westwood et al., 2003), other studies suggest that there are 
only incremental changes between the two conditions which primarily reflect an extra 300-400 ms 
of decay of the visual representation used to guide the hand movement (Elliott & Calvert, 1990; 
Hesse & Franz, 2009, 2010). Also, in two of their earlier studies (investigating the effect of the 
Mueller-Lyer illusion on grasping), Westwood and colleagues (Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2000; 
Westwood, McEachern, & Roy, 2001) argued that OL-Move grasping movements were actually very 
similar to OL-Signal movements but considerably different from movements observed in a closed-
loop conditions thereby stressing the importance of online visual feedback processes.  
It is important to mention at this point that the contribution of feedback processes to effective 
movement control has been a matter of considerable debate within the motor control literature for 
a long time (for review see Desmurget & Grafton, 2003). Specifically the early observations that a) 
relatively accurate actions can be performed when no sensory feedback is available and b) feedback 
loops might be too slow to control (fast) movements efficiently (Beaubaton & Hay, 1986; Carlton, 
1981; Keele & Posner, 1968; Zelaznik et al., 1983) have led to the view that our movements might,  
by and large, be controlled in a feedforward manner with sensory feedback loops having only limited 
influence toward the end of the movement (for review see Desmurget & Grafton, 2003). However, 
while it was soon agreed that, due to the inherent sensory delays, fast hand movements cannot be 
efficiently controlled by sensory feedback loops alone, it was also found that these movements are 
considerably more accurate when sensory information is available (e.g., Carlton, 1981; Ghez, 
Gordon, & Ghilardi, 1995) undermining the hypothesis that fast hand movements are primarily 
under pre-programmed (feedforward) control. Hence, neither a model based solely on feedback 
mechanisms nor one that relies exclusively on feedforward control seems able to adequately 
capture the underlying control processes. Currently, the prevailing assumption is that feedback and 
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feedforward control are combined in a forward model (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Miall & 
Wolpert, 1996). In this model, the motor system has learnt the consequences of a certain motor 
command (efferent signal) and uses this information to predict the expected sensory feedback. The 
prediction is then stored until the sensory feedback information becomes available (bridging the 
time needed to process this information), and the predicted and sensory states can be compared. If 
there is a mismatch in this information, an error signal is produced which in turn is used to update 
the prediction, modulate the motor command accordingly, and also to recalibrate the internal model 
which is involved in the feedforward control of movements. The beauty of this model is that it 
makes feedback strategies viable also for faster movements and that the position of the limb can be 
corrected despite significant time delays in the processing of feedback signals. Regarding the 
functional anatomy of the process, it has been suggested that a forward model of the arm’s 
dynamics is maintained within the posterior parietal cortex that is used to predict the final state of 
the movement (for review see Desmurget & Grafton, 2000, 2003). In particular, the posterior 
parietal cortex is supposed to be involved in the computation of the dynamic motor error obtained 
by comparing the predicted movement point with the actual current end-point through forward 
modelling. The resulting error signal is then sent to the cerebellum which converts this information 
into a corrective error command. These parietal-cerebellar circuits are currently assumed to play a 
major role in hand movement guidance (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Mulliken & Andersen, 2009). In 
short we can conclude that while our understanding regarding the precise mechanism by which 
visual feedback improves motor behaviour has changed in recent years, the relevance of visual 
feedback for optimal motor control is in no doubt. This means that studies that confound the 
manipulation of delay with the availability of visual feedback cannot provide conclusive evidence on 
the impact of delays on movement accuracy. Disentangling feedback and delays is however not the 
only issue, another issue concerns the precise way in which the length of the delay interval is 
expected to influence motor performance.  
According to the real-time view, the length of the delay should have no major effects on movement 
accuracy as visual feedback is always unavailable and, most importantly, all delayed movements are 
programmed based on the perceptual and long-lasting representations maintained within the 
ventral stream. Regarding these delay-dependent changes in movement kinematics, the proponents 
of the real-time hypothesis do not make any strong predictions. In fact, it has been suggested that it 
is likely that the visual representation in the ventral stream is subject to a gradual and continuous 
decay process (Westwood et al., 2003). Generally, as discussed above, the literature seems to 
indicate that movement kinematics change quite considerably during the first 2 seconds after visual 
occlusion but only very little following longer delays (Bradshaw & Watt, 2002; Elliott & Madalena, 
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1987; Heath & Binsted, 2007). To sum up, a careful look at the available literature reveals that there 
are currently no studies published that investigate reaching and grasping movements to simple 
objects (non-illusory context) in all the, according to the real-time view, critical vision conditions (CL, 
OL-Move, OL-Signal, OL-Delay) and report findings that support all of the assumptions made by this 
hypothesis.  
In fact, until now, the studies investigating either manual aiming (Elliott & Calvert, 1990; Heath et al., 
2004) or grasping movements to simple objects (Hesse & Franz, 2009, 2010) in all four critical vision 
conditions seem to suggest a continuous but rapid decay of the underlying visual information but no 
clear qualitative change in movement kinematics dependent on whether or not vision of the target 
was available during movement initiation. Specifically, Hesse & Franz argued that the decay 
characteristics (i.e. increased variability and decreased accuracy) could be best described by an 
exponential decay function, similar to those described in classical memory research (e.g., Anderson 
& Tweney, 1997; Ebbinghaus, 1885; Loftus, Duncan, & Gehrig, 1992; Wickelgren, 1970). Additionally, 
there are two studies that try to qualify the decay functions of visual information using a continuous 
tapping task (Binsted, Rolheiser, & Chua, 2006; Rolheiser, Binsted, & Brownell, 2006). While the use 
of continuous tapping tasks requiring repetitive movements has the advantage that the information 
decay can be monitored continuously, the studies applying continuous movement paradigms did not 
test specifically for the distinct effects of occluding target visibility during the movement initiation 
phase. Furthermore, even though both studies employed a very similar paradigm, their results were 
contradictory. While Rolheiser et al. (2006) observed a linear increase in movement variability as 
soon as vision was occluded, Binsted et al. (2006) reported a plateau of maintained movement 
accuracy for about 2 seconds after visual occlusion followed by a second-order decay.   
The studies discussed so far investigated how reaching and grasping movements performed to 
simple targets are affected by the introduction of a pre-response delay. Even though it has been 
argued that decreased accuracy and increased variability reflect a decay (or change) of the 
underlying visual representation used for movement programming, these studies cannot exclude the 
possibility that instead of visual information, motor information is decaying. That is, it would be 
equally likely that during the preview period a movement plan is generated and stored for later 
execution. In this case, the deterioration observed with increasing delays would reflect the decay of 
the pre-prepared motor responses and not the decay of the visual input. To put it differently, the 
above findings indicating performance decrements with delays between target presentation and 
response initiation can only count in favour of the dorsal amnesia hypothesis if the performance 
decrements actually reflect visual decay and not motor decay. In the next section, we will discuss 
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studies which tried to disentangle visual decay and motor decay in delayed movement execution. 
The methodological tool employed to track the source of visual information used in tasks with and 
without delays are perceptual illusions.  
5. Visual illusions, actions and delays 
Evidence for the suggestion that the altered movement kinematics after delay are indeed a result of 
degraded visual information comes from studies investigating the effect of visual illusion on reaching 
and grasping kinematics in different vision conditions (e.g., Gentilucci, Chieffi, Daprati, Saetti, & Toni, 
1996; Hu & Goodale, 2000; Westwood & Goodale, 2003; Westwood et al., 2000; Westwood, 
McEachern, et al., 2001). In short, the rationale of these studies is that when vision is available 
during the movement (or at least during movement initiation) the movement is programmed based 
on the metrically accurate representation of the dorsal stream and hence undeceived by the illusion. 
In contrast, when a response delay is introduced the movement has to be programmed based on the 
stored perceptual representation of the ventral stream and is therefore susceptible to the illusion. 
Even though almost all studies consistently find an increased illusion effect in the delay conditions as 
compared to closed-loop or open-loop conditions, the findings are not in direct support of the real-
time hypothesis. Most importantly, the real-time hypothesis would predict that movements are 
unaffected by the illusion when vision is available during movement initiation (OL-Move condition) 
but deceived by it when vision is occluded at the moment movement initiation is required (OL-
Signal). However, while indeed some studies did not report illusion effects on visuomotor 
performance when vision was occluded at movement initiation (Hu & Goodale, 2000; Westwood & 
Goodale, 2003); most studies find reliably illusion effects also in the OL-Move condition (Franz, 2001; 
Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Franz et al., 2009; Heath, Rival, Westwood, & Neely, 
2005; Hesse, Franz, & Schenk, 2016; Kopiske et al., 2016; Westwood, McEachern, et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, even though illusion effects on actions are often found to be reduced as compared to 
perceptual judgments, numerous studies still observe small but reliable illusion effects on 
visuomotor performance, even in full vision conditions (Aglioti et al., 1995; Bruno, Bernardis, & 
Gentilucci, 2008; for metaanalysis, see Bruno & Franz, 2009; Bruno, Knox, & de Grave, 2010; for 
review, Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Heath et al., 2005; Kopiske et al., 2016). Besides, the real-time 
hypothesis predicts that illusion effects should be similar for movements performed in OL-Signal 
conditions and delayed conditions (both mediated by the ventral stream). The findings regarding this 
prediction are much more consistent and largely in support of this notion (Franz et al., 2009; 
Gentilucci et al., 1996; Westwood et al., 2000; Westwood, McEachern, et al., 2001). Interestingly, 
however, Franz et al. (2009) showed that illusion effects increase almost linearly the earlier vision is 
suppressed during movement execution. Based on their findings, they argued that the size of the 
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illusion effect on grasping can be better explained by the availability of visual feedback during 
grasping than by a shift from dorsal to ventral stream control (for similar argument see, Mon-
Williams & Bull, 2000; Post & Welch, 1996). According to their view, the fact that illusion effects are 
of similar size for movements performed in OL-Signal and delay conditions therefore simply reflects 
the fact that there is no opportunity for online corrections in both conditions. In line with this 
suggestion, it was recently reported by de Brouwer, Brenner, Medendorp, and Smeets (2014) that 
presentation time but not response delay determines the size of saccadic illusion effects in the 
Mueller-Lyer figure.  
Last but not least, it should be noted, that over the last years it has repeatedly been argued that the 
apparent dissociation between perception (large illusion effects) and action (small or no illusion 
effects) may mainly be due to the numerous methodological differences between conditions (see, 
Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz, 2001; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Franz et al., 2009; Hesse, Franz, 
et al., 2016; Mon-Williams & Bull, 2000; Pavani, Boscagli, Benvenuti, Rabuffetti, & Farnè, 1999; Post 
& Welch, 1996; Smeets & Brenner, 2006; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002), therefore 
generally questioning the usefulness of the paradigm to investigate the temporal processing 
characteristics of the dorsal and the ventral stream. 
Thus, to summarise, studies employing visual illusions as stimuli are of particular importance for 
testing the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis in neurologically intact participants as they provide an elegant 
way of testing whether the observed decrement in visuomotor performance after delay can be 
attributed to a switch to a less suited (i.e. ventral stream) source of visual information (following the 
rapid decay of the relevant visual information in the better suited dorsal stream), or indicates 
instead a decay of the underlying motor program. Only if it can convincingly be shown that 
visuomotor performance deteriorates because of a loss in the quality of the relevant visual 
information, the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis can potentially be validated. While, at a first glance, 
there seems unequivocal support for the prediction that delays enhance illusion effects on actions, a 
more careful review of the literature shows that these changes are not at all in line with the more 
specific assumption that the occurrence of illusion effects on actions depends on whether or not 
visual information is available during movement programming (i.e. real-time view of action control). 
Moreover, there are a) methodological issues, i.e. the fact that illusions seem to reliably affect 
actions also in full-vision conditions (and to a similar extent than perceptions) when conditions are 
carefully matched and results are correctly analysed (see Kopiske et al., 2016 for an in-depth 
discussion), and b) alternative explanations, i.e. the fact that the removal of visual feedback can 
explain the differences between memory conditions, that challenge the idea that visual illusions 
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provide a reliable tool to measure the influence of the ventral (perceptual) stream on action 
processing.  
Therefore, it appears that evidence from illusion studies is also not suited to provide convincing 
support for the claim that visual information decays rapidly in dorsal stream thereby causing the 
presumed switch to the ventral stream as visual source for action guidance and consequently an 
observed deterioration in performance levels after delay. Hence, the question arises if there are 
alternative methods and measures that can be used to determine whether actions are primarily 
based on dorsal or ventral stream input after memory delay. One alternative approach that has been 
suggested in this context is to look at the distinction between allocentric and egocentric information 
processing more generally and independent of illusory context. In the following, we will briefly 
summarise some of the key findings of the studies on this topic and will argue that in these studies 
too there is no clear evidence for the suggestion that memory delays force an inevitable switch from 
a dorsal to a ventral information processing mode.  
6. The role of allocentric and egocentric cues for the visual guidance of actions 
The underlying assumption of why visual illusions affect movements performed after delay but not 
in real time is that, according to the perception-action model, the long-lasting information 
represented within the ventral stream maintains information in an allocentric frame of reference 
(taking the environmental context into account). In contrast, the real-time information maintained in 
the dorsal stream is supposed to be represented in an egocentric frame of reference (relative to the 
observer). Hence, visual illusions will affect visuomotor actions only if visuomotor programming is 
based on an allocentric representation, but not if it is based on an egocentric representation (see 
also, Bridgeman, Gemmer, Forsman, & Huemer, 2000). Considering that it is hotly debated whether 
or not the visual illusion paradigm is suitable for revealing differences in the processing of perceptual 
and visuomotor information, the question arises of how else it can be tested which reference frame 
is used for information processing. The easiest way of investigating the use of allocentric information 
for visuomotor guidance is to let participants perform movements in either complete darkness (only 
egocentric information available) or in the presence of visual landmark cues (such as a structured 
background providing an allocentric reference frame). Previous studies suggest that when 
movements are carried out in the presence of visual landmarks, humans use a combination of both 
allocentric and egocentric cues in order to perform as accurately as possible (Carrozzo, Stratta, 
McIntyre, & Lacquaniti, 2002; Conti & Beauboton, 1980; Lemay, Bertram, & Stelmach, 2004; Redon 
& Hay, 2005; Toni, Gentilucci, Jeannerod, & Decety, 1996). In line with the predictions of the 
perception-action model, studies further showed that the significance of allocentric cues for 
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visuomotor control increases when a memory delay is introduced (Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 
1997; Chen, Byrne, & Crawford, 2011; Hay & Redon, 2006; Krigolson & Heath, 2004; Obhi & Goodale, 
2005), especially if these cues are task-relevant (Fiehler, Wolf, Klinghammer, & Blohm, 2014). 
However, contrasting the idea that immediate actions are based on egocentric information only 
while delayed actions are based on allocentric information only, it was also observed that both 
open-loop reaches performed in real-time (OL-Move) as well as reaches performed after longer 
delays benefit from the availability of allocentric information provided either before (Obhi & 
Goodale, 2005) or during the pointing movement  (Krigolson & Heath, 2004). Furthermore, Krigolson 
and Heath (2004) also reported that in the presence of visual landmarks closed-loop reaches 
remained more accurate than open-loop or delayed movements, signifying again the importance of 
visual feedback processes. 
In short, all these studies provide strong evidence for the notion that both memory-guided and real-
time movements make use of allocentric information if available. While memory-guided movements 
tend to profit more strongly from the availability of allocentric information - suggesting that the 
visual system gives indeed more weight to allocentric than to egocentric information as memory 
demands increase - there seems to be no evidence for a clear cut shift from the use of one kind of 
reference frame (egocentric) to the use of a different kind of reference frame (allocentric) 
depending on vision condition. Instead it seems that both memory-guided and real-time movements 
recruit the same spatial maps albeit with different weights given to different spatial cues. This point 
was also confirmed by Rogers and colleagues (2009). They tested the claim that memory-guided and 
real-time movements are based on distinct visuospatial maps by using a visuospatial learning 
paradigm. Using such a paradigm, we can induce changes to a spatial map employed in one task, and 
then examine whether those modifications will also affect performance in a second task. If the 
answer is yes, it might be concluded that the two tasks use the same spatial maps. Rogers and 
colleagues used the prismatic-adaptation paradigm. Participants are asked to wear prismatic goggles 
which shift their view by a few degrees to one side, e.g. the right. Participants will then perform 
visually based tasks such as pointing to targets or grasping an object and will rapidly learn that they 
need to adjust their movements to successfully interact with their visual environment. When the 
goggles are removed participants will show for some time a typical error which is spatially opposite 
to the spatial shift introduced by the goggles. This so-called postprismatic adaptation error is taken 
as evidence for the presumed re-calibration of the visuospatial map that was used for the 
visuomotor behaviour during the adaptation period (for more details on the prismatic adaptation 
procedure, see Newport & Schenk, 2012). If memory-guided and real-time movements rely on 
separate maps, one might expect that the visuospatial recalibration that takes place when memory-
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guided actions are performed will not affect the map used for real-time actions and vice versa. 
Accordingly one would expect that prism adaptation effects obtained with memory-guided actions 
do not transfer to real-time actions and vice versa. However, contrary to these expectations a 
substantial transfer of prism adaptation effects between those two conditions was observed (Rogers 
et al., 2009). Thus, it appears that delayed and immediate movements share common visuospatial 
resources. 
Thus, similar to the findings from the illusion studies, the empirical observations point to a more 
gradual transition in the use of the available visual information rather than to a sudden switch 
between representations and processing modes (i.e. dorsal to ventral). Additionally, according to the 
perception-action model, egocentric spatial information should neither be used nor be available at 
all when movements are performed after longer delays (based on perceptual information). In 
contrast to this notion, Fiehler, Schütz, and Henriques (2011) showed that reaching targets are 
encoded and updated in a gaze-dependent egocentric frame of reference even when movements 
were delayed for up to 12 seconds. Unfortunately, a shortcoming of this study was that movements 
had to be performed in complete darkness, thus preventing the generation of an allocentric 
representation. In a follow-up study, Schütz, Henriques, and Fiehler (2013) investigated if gaze 
centred spatial updating also occurs when delayed reaching movements are performed in the 
presence of visual landmarks. They found that gaze dependent reaching errors persisted in 
conditions with available landmarks even though they were reduced compared to a no-landmarks 
condition. Further supporting the notion that egocentric target information can be maintained for a 
considerable amount of time after the movement target is removed from view, Ball and colleagues 
(2009) reported that participants benefited from the availability of egocentric cues in a visual search 
task even after a delay of more than 2 seconds. They used the spatial priming paradigm of visual 
search where the repeated presentation of the search target at the same location will lead to 
reliable reduction of search time  It was found that regardless of whether this position was coded in 
an allocentric or egocentric format the priming effect always survived delays of several seconds (Ball, 
Smith, Ellison, & Schenk, 2010; Ball et al., 2009). In conclusion, these findings are inconsistent with 
the idea that egocentric representations are highly transient. Thus, even though the allocentric 
information is likely to be weighted higher after delay, egocentric information still seems to be 
available to the visuomotor system. The conclusion is in line with previous studies suggesting that 
egocentric and allocentric information is combined for movement execution based on their relative 
reliabilities (Byrne & Crawford, 2010; McGuire & Sabes, 2009). 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
In this article we focused on one specific aspect of the perception-action model, its claim of the 
transient nature of the visual information processed in the dorsal stream. This claim, which we called 
the dorsal amnesia hypothesis, led to some interesting predictions and findings and received 
support from a wide range of different scientific domains. In this review, we critically re-examined 
the evidence from those different domains. We come to the conclusion that neither the findings 
from functional imaging and non-human primate single-unit recordings, nor the findings from 
behavioural studies with neurological patients and neurologically-healthy participants provide 
compelling support for the dorsal amnesia hypothesis. However, there might be a different and 
more nuanced version of the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis that deserves further consideration and 
investigation. This nuanced version would stipulate that the time-dependent decay of visual 
information might be different for different visual attributes and also depends on the format of the 
representation, with allocentric representations being less affected by time-dependent changes than 
egocentric representations (see Hesse, Miller, & Buckingham, 2016; Hesse & Schenk, 2014 for 
examples). Accordingly, one might expect that the mix of visual information used for a given 
visuomotor task might indeed depend on the time elapsed between the receipt of that information 
and the onset of the associated action. Consequently, it might be expected that some tasks will be 
more influenced by the delays than others. Evidence for such a time-dependent change in the 
contribution of different sensory attributes to action control has been provided by a number of 
studies (see for example, Byrne & Crawford, 2010; Schütz et al., 2013), but it is worth reiterating that 
the differences are gradual and relative, and not absolute.  
Most importantly, the original version of the dorsal amnesia hypothesis is in our view no longer 
tenable. A hypothesis which postulates a ventral-stream with exclusive access to visual memory and 
a dorsal pathway without memory access, distinct pathways and distinct visual representations for 
delayed and non-delayed actions is hard to uphold in the face of evidence of neural activity 
maintained for several seconds in dorsal-stream areas (see section 1), evidence of preserved 
performance in delayed visuomotor action in spite of extensive ventral-stream damage (see section 
2), and evidence that visual illusions affect both immediate and delayed actions (see section 4). 
Given that the dorsal amnesia hypothesis is an integral part of the perception-action model its 
dismissal has implications for the model in general.  
We argued above that the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis deserves a special place in the perception-
action framework for several reasons. Firstly, the hypothesis provides the most clear-cut behavioural 
criterion to distinguish between ventral and dorsal functions. As has been argued before, other 
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criteria such as perception versus action, indirect versus direct action, planning versus programming, 
deliberate versus automatic are fraud with ambivalence and hard to apply to concrete tasks and 
experimental paradigms (see Schenk, 2010). In contrast, the distinction between delayed versus 
immediate action is clear and can be measured in milliseconds (see Westwood & Goodale, 2003). 
Thus, one might argue that the predictions of the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis provide strong tests of 
the model and it is therefore disappointing that the outcomes of these tests frequently fails to fall in 
line with the model’s predictions. Dismissing the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis thus means depriving 
the model of its most clear-cut behavioural criterion for distinguishing between ventral and dorsal 
function, thereby blunting its capacity for providing falsifiable predictions.  
There is a second reason for why the dorsal-amnesia hypothesis is of special relevance to the model. 
The hypothesis predicted a novel finding which apparently can only be explained within the 
framework of the perception-action model. It led to the discovery that patients with optic ataxia 
produce fewer errors when they have to point or reach for memorised visual targets, and may adjust 
their visuomotor response to the properties of memorised targets even if a novel target is 
presented. We argued above that these are indeed puzzling findings, but we also showed that the 
findings still remain puzzling even when considered within the perception-action framework. This is 
important for two reasons: Firstly, it shows that one of the model’s most impressive discoveries is in 
fact a challenge to the model and cannot be counted in its support. Secondly, our reinterpretation of 
the findings on optic ataxia undermines a critique directed at sceptics of the perception-action 
model. Westwood and Goodale (2011) argued that regardless of how we view the controversy on 
illusions and actions, the fact remains that no model rejecting the concept of functionally distinct 
visual pathways for perception and action can explain the neuropsychological evidence obtained on 
patients with ventral and dorsal stream damage. It was previously argued that this is not true in the 
case of patient DF (see Schenk, 2010). With respect to optic ataxia, we argue here that while it is 
currently true that no good explanation has been offered for some of the relevant findings, this 
explanatory shortcoming also applies to the perception-action model. Thus, we agree that some of 
the neuropsychological findings are challenging and still require a compelling explanation. We 
would, however, argue that this challenge applies to all neuropsychological researchers regardless of 
their theoretical persuasion. This means there is no reason to assume that a satisfactory account can 
only be found within the two-visual pathway framework.  
The dorsal amnesia hypothesis has been one of the least challenged and most productive 
components of the perception-action model. In this review, we argue that this hypothesis in its 
original form is incompatible with a considerable number of findings and therefore provides little 
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support for the perception-action model. As other central aspects of the model have been criticized 
as well (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Kopiske et al., 2016; Schenk, Franz, & Bruno, 2011; Schenk & 
McIntosh, 2010), it is questionable whether the perception-action model still provides sufficient 
explanatory value to be seen as a useful model of how the primate visual system is organized.  
This leads us to the next question5. If we challenge the perception-action model, what model can we 
propose in its place? To some extent, most critical challenges to the model have already implied an 
alternative view. Whenever a certain piece of evidence for the perception-action model has been 
criticized, this critique always included an alternative account. Dassonville and Bala (2004), Franz and 
Gegenfurtner (2008), Schenk (2012a), Jackson et al. (2009), Hesse and Schenk (2013), Utz, Hesse, 
Aschenneller, and Schenk (2015), to name just a few studies, all proposed and confirmed factors that 
could account for the perception-action dissociations without assuming a division of labour between 
vision for perception and vision for action. Implied in these critical papers is an alternative 
framework that assumed that the visual system is not divided into separate streams but consists of 
specialized cortical regions forming ad-hoc networks to generate task-specific behaviour (see 
Schenk, 2010; Schenk et al. 2011 for a more detailed description). However, not everybody is 
convinced by such an alternative framework (Westwood & Goodale, 2011). The problem seems to 
be that perception-action dissociations found in different contexts receive different explanations 
within the alternative framework. Given that the perception-action model manages to explain the 
same set of observations with just a few simple principles, an alternative view will only be seen as 
competitive if it replaces the assumptions of the perception-action model with a set of assumptions 
that is comparable in size and simplicity, and has the same explanatory reach. Is this requirement for 
an acceptable alternative view justified? In the following, we will argue that several issues are 
associated with this requirement: a valid demand that can be met, a misconception that needs to be 
resolved, and a hope that should guide our future research but not our response to valid criticism.  
It is a valid demand that when two alternative accounts for the same observations are compared, 
the number and complexity of novel or additional assumptions needed for each account have to be 
considered. Everything else being the same, the more parsimonious account, i.e. the one with fewer 
assumptions, is preferred. It seems the perception-model is superior in this regard managing to 
explain a wide range of observations with only a few principles. However, this impression is 
deceptive. It is true that different mechanisms and concepts have been evoked by sceptics to explain 
                                                          
5 These final paragraphs were inspired by a comment from an anonymous reviewer who questioned the 
scientific merit of a review (such as ours) that criticizes an established model without offering suggestions for 
an alternative. Given that similar comments were frequently raised in the past, we decided it is time to provide 
a detailed answer to this challenge. 
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the different instances of perception-action dissociations. However, the employed mechanisms and 
concepts, such as the benefit of sensory feedback (Hesse & Franz, 2010; Schenk, 2012a) or the need 
to calibrate measuring variables (Franz, Fahle, Bülthoff, & Gegenfurtner, 2001; Franz & 
Gegenfurtner, 2008; Hesse, Franz, et al., 2016), are well established and do not require novel 
assumptions. No other assumptions about brain organization or brain processes are implied or 
needed. Importantly, the alternative view can dispense with the very assumptions that define the 
perception-action model. Seen in this light, the alternative view seems to offer the more 
parsimonious framework. It should also be noted that parsimony is only one of several criteria used 
to judge the merit of scientific models. A successful alternative account is also expected to generate 
correct predictions. Such predictions were derived and confirmed for most of the studies that 
suggested alternative accounts. The study by Dassonville and Bala (2004) provides a good example. 
They looked at the induced Roelof illusion and the finding that this illusion affects anti-pointing but 
not pro-pointing. This dissociation was taken as evidence for the claim that illusions affect only tasks 
based on ventral stream processing (i.e. anti-pointing). Dassonville and Bala (2004) proposed an 
alternative hypothesis: The induced Roelof illusion shifts the perception of our subjective midpoint. 
They argued that such a midpoint shift will affect the spatial coding of the hand and the target. In 
pro-pointing, the two effects will cancel each other out. In anti-pointing, the shift in midpoint will 
affect both the computation of the distance between visual target and midpoint, and the projection 
of that distance into opposite hemispace. As a result, the error in anti-pointing should be twice as 
big as the error measured with a perceptual matching task. This finding was confirmed in two 
independent labs. It illustrates that alternative accounts for the perception-action model generate 
novel findings not predicted by the perception-action model.  
Nevertheless, we anticipate that there may still be researchers who are not convinced by this 
answer (see for example: Milner & Goodale, 2006, p. 241). We also suspect that those researchers 
wait for an alternative model that can meet stricter demands. They may expect a model which 
provides a common principle to explain the evidence on perceptual illusions, visual form agnosia and 
optic ataxia. However, what is it that the perception-action model explains about illusions, form 
agnosia and optic ataxia? The perception-action model explains neither of these phenomena per se, 
it primarily explains why dissociations between perceptual and visuomotor tasks occur in these 
domains. Thus, the only common feature linking those domains is the occurrence of perception-
action dissociations. Provide alternative accounts for those dissociations and the link is lost. Outside 
of the theoretical framework of the perception-action model, visual illusions, visual form agnosia 
and optic ataxia have as much in common as for example, colour constancy, neglect and apraxia. 
Thus, it seems almost unavoidable that an alternative that replaces the perception-action principle 
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with something else will destroy the link between illusions, agnosia and optic ataxia. Therefore, an 
alternative view should not be expected to provide a new link between those domains. The demand 
for a new principle providing a new link between those domains may also be motivated by the idea 
that it is easier to compare two scientific alternatives when both alternatives are based on one key 
hypothesis that aims to explain the same set of data. This seems to facilitate the application of the 
principle of parsimony. Given that two alternative models explain the exact same observations, the 
model containing the smallest number of assumptions is preferred. We concede that such a case 
provides an easy situation for selecting the best model based on parsimony. It is, however, wrong to 
demand that when judging parsimony, we restrict ourselves to the assumptions inherent to the core 
hypothesis. Parsimony has to be judged relative to the total sum of assumptions in a given scientific 
field. The account that provides the best explanatory fit with the least number of additional 
assumptions is the most parsimonious. In this calculation assumptions are not counted if they have 
already been established by earlier findings and form part of uncontroversial models or 
explanations. This means that an alternative that uses ten different well-established assumptions to 
explain a set of ten findings is still more parsimonious than a model that needs to introduce only one 
but one additional principle to account for those findings. 
We would like to illustrate this point using a spoof theory: the colour-attraction model (CAM). 
Imagine that someone suggests that objects of similar colour attract each other. As evidence for this 
model the following findings are presented: Animals are frequently found on backgrounds that share 
their colour; in a rainbow similar colours are next to each other; in recycling containers glass bottles 
of the same colour are found in the same container. It seems CAM explains findings from three 
different domains using just on simple principle. However, we know that the correct explanations 
are different. Camouflage explains why animals seek out backgrounds matching their own colour. 
Laws of optics explain the sequence of colours in the rainbow, and recycling laws are responsible for 
the sorting of bottles according to their colours. In this case, the correct explanations use more 
assumptions than CAM, use different assumptions for each of the three different observations, and 
do not provide an alternative, unifying principle. Yet, they are still the better explanations because 
their assumptions are already well-established, meaning that the CAM assumption is superfluous. 
This fictive example is not meant as persiflage of the perception-action model which we consider a 
useful scientific model. Nevertheless, the mock example serves our purpose. It shows that it is not 
necessarily justified to demand an alternative account which uses just one small set of coherent 
assumptions to explain a set of different observations previously associated with the perception-
action model.  
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Behind the demand for an alternative model that replaces the assumptions of the perception-action 
model with another set of simple principles also lies a hope – the hope that some of the simplicity 
and order that the perception-action model imposed on the complex architecture of the primate 
visual system (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) will eventually be restored. We share this hope and 
concede that the alternative view sketched out here and elsewhere (Schenk, 2010; Schenk et al., 
2011) does not provide progress in this direction. We would, however, also insist that the business 
of examining the problems, describing the flaws and testing the implications of an established model 
can be done independently of the business of developing a detailed alternative account. A 
mandatory linking of the two, as is sometimes suggested, is in our view counterproductive. It sets 
the bar too high for valid criticism, stifles scientific debate, and if upheld as a general principle 
renders scientific models unproductive and thus hinders scientific progress. 
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